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Article I, Section 11, Utah Constitution . .

passim

ARGUMENT

The Analysis In Berry Is Fully Applicable to Burgandy's Appeal
The state begins its response by asserting that the analysis
employed in Berry By And Through Berry v. Beech Aircraftf 717
P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) is inapplicable to Burgandy's case, because
the statute in question does not "abrogate" his right of access
to the courts.

Brief of Appellee, at 13.

It rejects the tests

established in Berry and says that the "[p]roper inquiry is
whether the potential repayment of benefits received pending an
unsuccessful eligibility challenge unreasonably bars judicial
access."

(emphasis added).

Brief of the Appellee, at 13.

The

state seems to be reading Berry as applying only to statutes
which totally eliminate access to the courts or which place a
time limit on access, such as a statute of limitations or repose.
But the state offers nothing from Berry or other case law to
support its narrow interpretation.

Berry did not involve a

statute that eliminated entirely a remedy or cause of action; the
statute in Berry simply limited the time in which a remedy could
be sought.

A statute which chills or burdens a GA recipient's

right to a pretermination hearing does not eliminate a remedy
entirely but it does limit it.
While admittedly no case has yet applied Berry to facts
similar to those raised in this appeal, the state's conclusion
that Berry is only relevant to the review of statutes which
"abrogate" or "bar" a citizen's right of access to the courts is

1

not supported by the case law.

In Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d

1357, 1361 (Utah App. 1993), this court addressed whether the
protective scope of the open courts provision should be limited
to invalidating statutes of repose.

The court concluded it

should not, pointing out:
The supreme court views section 11 as having
potentially broad application. Horton, 785
P.2d at 1093. The open courts provision is
not primarily concerned with particular,
identifiable causes of action, but rather
with the availability of legal remedies to
vindicate individuals' interest "in the
integrity of their persons, property and
reputations.1 Berry,
111 P.2d at 677 n. 4.
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361.
The court went on to highlight those principles in Berry
which support a broad application of the open courts provision.
It noted that this provision:
guarantees "access to the courts and a
judicial procedure that is based on fairness
and equality,' and prevents arbitrary
deprivation of "effective remedies designed
to protect basic individual rights.1
Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361, quoting
675.

Berry,

111 P.2d at

Moreover, this court noted:
[SJection 11 imposes limits on the
legislature for the protection of injured
persons who are isolated in society and
lacking political influence. Berry,
111 P.2d
at 676; Condemarin,
775 P.2d at 367
(Zimmerman, J., concurring).

Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d at 1361.
The state makes passing reference to these principles in its
brief, but fails to come to grips with their meaning in the

2

context of this appeal.

A fundamental difference between

Burgandy and the state is that Burgandy regards GA recipients as
precisely the category of individuals which the Supreme Court
deemed in need of protection under the open courts provision.
When a fundamental right is involved, such as the right to a
pretermination hearing, the case deserves the same careful
scrutiny as was afforded a prisoner seeking habeas corpus review
in Currierf a case which the state barely acknowledges.
The state's failure to take to heart the principles
established in Berry influences other statements it makes in its
brief.

Having rejected Berry, the state gives short shrift to a

reasonable alternative patterned on the Social Security
Administration policy for waiving overpayments of this type.

The

state rejects the suggestion and responds that the reasonable
alternatives suggested "represent decisions to be made in the
legislative and policy-making arenas."

Brief of Appellee, at 19.

However, Burgandy and other GA recipients are precisely the kind
of individuals who are incapable of influencing the political
process to bring about such changes.

For that very reason, they

need the protection of the open courts provision.
The state wrongly suggests that GA recipients are able to
receive all the relief they need through the administrative
process.

While a GA recipient facing termination may seek review

in the administrative system, and eventually in the courts if
necessary, the suggestion begs the question raised by this
appeal—whether applying the statute to permit recovery of an
3

overpayment chills or burdens a GA recipient's right to a
pretermination hearing.
The state's assurance at page 12 of its brief that GA
recipients assessed an overpayment for continued benefits are
provided "an effective and reasonable remedy for challenging the
establishment and collection of overpayments" is false and
misleading.

Other than the protection sought by this appeal

under the Utah Constitutionf there is no effective means of
challenging the atypical overpayment at issue in this case.
Burgandy's case is evidence of that. To exhaust his
administrative remedies, Burgandy requested review of the
overpayment but there were no factual or legal issues in dispute.
R-68-70.

Unlike an overpayment alleged on the basis of mistake,

fraud or administrative error, which can be challenged through a
hearing, administrative review of continued benefits overpayments
is meaningless.
Burgandy's Case Is Not Controlled By The Jensen Decision
Having concluded that Berry is inapplicable because the
statute at issue does not bar or abrogate access to the courts,
the state redefines the issue at page 17 of its brief.

There,

the state says the issue to be addressed by the court is:
"whether the possibility of repayment of continued benefits
unreasonably burdens access to judicial review."
added) Brief of Appellee, at 17.

(Emphasis

Although it acknowledges that

the burdening of Burgandy's right to a constitutionally
established pretermination hearing is the issue, the state fails
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to offer convincing argument that the burden imposed is
reasonable.

Instead, the state likens the burden on Burgandy*s

constitutional pretermination hearing right to that of a
prepayment of a tax deficiency and concludes thatf because access
to the courts is not completely barred, it is reasonable.
The state's reliance on Jensen v. Utah State Tax Comm'n.,
835 P.2d 965 (Utah 1992) and cases following itf to support its
reasonable burden argument is misplaced.

Although the state

acknowledges some ambivalence in comparing Burgandy to Jensen-("[ajdmittedly Burgandy1s situation differs from that of these
other plaintiffs."

Brief of Appellee, at 16)--it fails to come

to grips with the many differences between Burgandy1s appeal and
Jensen.

Instead, the state offers conclusory statements without

ever grappling with the significant differences.
The state overlooks the nature of the right involved.
Jensen did not involve

a fundamental individual right.

The

state ignores the general principle stated in Currier v. Holden,
862 P.2d at 1364, that stricter scrutiny will be given to
measures that impinge upon civil liberties than those which
curtail what might be called "economic interests."
Appellant, at 16-17.

Brief of

The state acknowledges the constitutional

right of a GA recipient under Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
261, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) to a pretermination
hearing but fails to show how the interest at stake is the same
as that in Jensen.

Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927 (Utah App.

1995) probably comes closest to Burgandy1s case, since it
5

involved the constitutional right to petition for habeas corpus,
but even there the facts are readily distinguishable.

In Hansen,

a prisoner's exercise of his habeas corpus right was not
affected, since he had adequate resources for paying a filing
fee.
The state also ignores significant factual differences
between Burgandy's case and Jensen.

In both Jensen and Maryboy

v. Utah State Tax Comm., 904 P.2d 662 (Utah 1995) the issue could
be resolved through an objective determination of financial
means, using quantifiable variables at the start of the appeal
process.

The same cannot be said of GA recipients who do not

know in advance the precise amount of the overpayment they may
have to repay.

Lacking legal representation, many GA recipients

are unable to assess the likelihood of success at a hearing and
calculate the amount of overpayment that will likely accrue.
Without a vigorous advocate, a GA recipient can do little to
expedite the process and thereby lessen the amount of a possible
overpayment.
Given the unique vulnerability of many GA recipients, their
lack of knowledge and the uncertainty of the amount which may
have to be repaid, some GA recipients, out of fear and
frustration, will likely forego a hearing entirely, choosing to
return to homelessness and reliance on the community for support.
Some of those deterred from seeking a pretermination hearing may
not have meritorious cases, but some will.
lies in the fact that both are deterred.

6

The arbitrariness

It is not a sufficient answer to say that a GA recipient may
avoid a possible overpayment by not requesting continuing
benefits.

Goldberg v. Kelly establishes that GA benefits cannot

be terminated until a hearing is held.

It cannot be determined

that a GA recipient is ineligible until a hearing is held; in the
meantime, GA recipients with meritorious cases and those with
nonmeritorious cases will both be denied benefits.

Payment of

benefits retroactively to those cases found to be meritorious
does not lessen the burden, since the recipient was effectively
terminated prior to a hearing and suffered the loss of benefits
while waiting for his "pretermination hearing." The burden of
being without benefits is substituted for the burden of a
possible overpayment—both effects impinge upon a
constitutionally protected interest.
The State Has Ignored Relevant Case Law Cited By Appellant
In arguing that there is no unreasonable denial of access to
the courts, the state tries to distinguish Silver v. Cormier, 529
F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1976), because it involved the threatened
withholding of monies due and owing.

The state agrees that "a

threat to hold back money which is legally due and owing would be
a bar to accessing the courts."

Brief of Appellee, at 18.

The

state, however, ignores case law holding that it makes no
difference whether the claimant was entitled to the benefits in
question.

McCoy v. Goldinf 598 F.Supp. 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y.

1984)(discussed in Brief of Appellant, at 14-15).

McCoy relied,

in part, on Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694,
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33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972) which held:
For at least a quarter-century, this
Court has made clear that even though a
person has no "right* to a valuable
governmental benefit and even though the
government may deny him the benefit for any
number of reasons, there are some reasons
upon which the government may not rely. It
may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis
that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests...
The state declines to address the holdings of these cases in its
responding brief.
The state goes on to argue that it is "illogical" not to
recover benefits from a GA recipient once he is determined
ineligible.

Brief of Appellee, at 19.

However, as the United

States Supreme Court has made clear, there are circumstances
where a benefit cannot be denied.

The fundamental weakness in

the state's analysis is its failure to take seriously the right
to a pretermination hearing established in Goldberg v. Kelly.
That case determined that a GA recipient remains eligible for
benefits until a pretermination hearing.

A determination by the

state that someone receiving GA has improved and is no longer
eligible is not the same as an initial determination of
eligibility.

Burgandy and other similarly situated recipients

have been found eligible for benefits.

They remain presumptively

eligible until determined ineligible at a hearing.
initial finding of ineligibility is not final.

The state's

If a GA recipient

remains eligible until a pretermination hearing is held, then it
cannot later be said that the recipient was ineligible and, thus,
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overpaid.
The state is also incorrect in its broad conclusion that
there is no support in "Utah constitutional provisions, statutes
or case law" for providing benefits to someone regardless of
eligibility.

Brief of Appellee, at 19. One area the state

overlooks is equitable estoppel.

A number of Utah cases have

held that equitable estoppel may be invoked under certain
circumstances against a governmental entity, including the Utah
State Department of Social Services.

Mendez v. State Dept. Of

Social Services, 813 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991).

In such

cases, a recipient may have been ineligible for a benefit but,
because of misrepresentation by the government entity, repayment
cannot be required.

When Mendez was remanded, the state dropped

its claim against him.

Moreover, the state routinely declines

collection of overpayments where it is determined at a hearing
that the overpayment was caused by agency error.

It is

misleading to suggest, as the state does, that to accept
Burgandy's argument "would require the state to provide benefits
to a recipient regardless of eligibility."

Brief of Appellee, at

18-19.
Finally, the state questions, although it does not directly
challenge, the availability of the open courts provision to a
case originating at the administrative level.
at 11.

Brief of Appellee,

Although the issue has not been addressed in Utah case

law, at least one other state, applying a similar open courts
provision, has held it applicable at the administrative level.

9

State ex, rel, Stephan v, O'Keefe, 686 P.2d 171, 178 (Kan. 1984),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1088 (1984).

Brief of Appellant, at 10.

In this case, Burgandy claims the protection of the open courts
provision at the administrative level, since a GA recipient must
exhaust administrative remedies before petitioning for review in
district court under Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-15.

The

administrative hearing is the gateway to the judicial system; a
GA recipient deterred from requesting a pretermination hearing
cannot gain access to the courts.
CONCLUSION
The state looks at the facts presented in Burgandy's appeal
with sharp hindsight.

It prefers to focus on the fact that

Burgandy was determined ineligible for GA, since that focus
allows it to ignore the impact of the statute on Burgandy1s
constitutionally protected right to a pretermination hearing.
The court can insure the validity of that right by holding that
the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied.

The

court should reverse the lower court and order that the
overpayment may not be recovered.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of March, 1999.

<r Michael E. Bulson
Attorney for Appellant
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